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Voting with Feet: Community Choice in Social Dilemmas 
 
Economic and social interactions often take place in open communities but the dynamics of 
the community choice process and its impact on cooperation of its members are yet not well 
understood. We experimentally investigate community choice in social dilemmas. 
Participants repeatedly choose between a community with and an alternative without 
punishment opportunities. Within each community a social dilemma game is played. While 
the community with punishment grows over time and fully cooperates, the alternative 
becomes depopulated. We analyze the success of this “voting with feet” mechanism and find 
that endogenous self-selection is key while slow growth is less decisive. 
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The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies 
his preference pattern for public goods.                          Charles M. Tiebout (1956, p. 418) 
 
Understanding the determinants and the extent of human cooperation is one of the most 
challenging questions in economics. Human cooperation in social dilemmas is particularly 
puzzling because the conflict between collective and individual interests creates the well-
known free-rider problem (Garrett Hardin 1968, Robyn M. Dawes 1980, Elinor Ostrom 1999, 
Samuel Bowles 2004). In order to disentangle different motives for cooperation and defection, 
researchers have successfully studied behavior in controlled social dilemma experiments. In 
repeated interactions, cooperation turns out to be rarely stable and generally deteriorates to 
rather low levels over time (Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt 1993, John Ledyard 1995, 
Rachel T. Croson 1998, Ostrom 1998, Urs Fischbacher and Simon Gächter, forthcoming). 
More recent studies identify possibilities to punish norm violators as forceful means to 
increase cooperation. Decentralized one-to-one punishment that reduces the income of the 
punished player is heavily used (Ostrom et al. 1992, Ernst Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002) and 
is efficiency increasing in longer interactions (Gächter et al. 2008), even if punishing incurs 
costs for the punisher. 
A common feature of the vast majority of previous experimental studies on social dilemmas is 
that the interaction framework is exogenously imposed. In reality, however, humans often 
vote with their feet between different institutional frameworks governing the interaction with 
others. For example, employees choose to work in a company with an appealing corporate 
culture that encourages employees’ contributions, and to interact with others who are attracted 
by the same culture. People join different clubs, sports teams, and parties and commit to abide 
by their rules because they want to pursue certain activities and achieve certain goals with the 
help of others who join the same communities. Citizens move to different jurisdictions or 
even to different countries because these constitute a better fit for their preferences regarding 
public goods provision, ways of living, or the political system and because they prefer to live 
together with likeminded others who want to fulfill their citizen duties under the same 
system.
1 Along these lines, Tiebout (1956) suggests that individuals with similar preferences 
                                                 
1  An illustrative example of a company with an impressive corporate culture that attracts highly qualified 
employees and convinces them to provide enormous contributions to its success is Google (David A. Vise 2006). 
For a prominent example in history when people voted with their feet for a political system, recall the large-scale 
migration in the 1950s, when thousands of East Germans flew to the West to benefit from and to contribute to 
the “industrial miracle”. To quote from Time Magazine: “In the only kind of voting that remains to the East 
Germans—what one British diplomat calls voting with their feet—they have chosen to flee the country at a rate 
which for the past three months has averaged a startling 1,000 refugees a day.” (21 Nov 1955).   3
for different bundles of local public goods sort themselves into communities governed by 
different institutions in expectation of interacting with others who have chosen the same 
institution. He argues that if communities are sufficiently heterogeneous and consumer-voters 
are fully mobile, voting with feet generates considerable efficiency gains in public goods 
provision. Although all this suggests that voting with feet is likely to play a crucial role in 
shaping cooperative behavior within a community, its actual role in social dilemma situations 
has not yet been satisfactorily investigated. What makes voting with feet so important? Voting 
with feet might enhance the quality of the match between preferences and institutions. 
Identification with an institution and the resulting commitment to the prevailing social norms 
of its community members can be assumed to be high if institutions are chosen. Presumably 
the self-selected founding members of an institution are able to create and establish an initial 
culture which most likely is decisive for how strong subsequent members will be committed 
to the institution.
2 In this paper, we experimentally study the impact and the dynamics of 
voting with feet on community choice. 
To set our study on solid ground, we focus on the endogenous community choice between 
two “work-horse” institutions that separately have already been extensively discussed in the 
public goods literature. Experimental subjects repeatedly “vote with their feet” (henceforth 
VF) by choosing between joining a community with punishment possibilities (henceforth P) 
and joining a community with no punishment possibility (henceforth N). Within the chosen 
community members interact in a public goods game with all others who have chosen the 
same community. The behavior we observe provides illuminating insights. Initially, more 
than two-thirds of the subjects decide to avoid the community with punishment possibilities 
and vote with their feet for N. Over time, however, the proportion of subjects in the N 
community steadily decreases with an almost complete extinction towards the end of the 
experiment. The few subjects who initially choose P heavily punish free-riders and achieve 
almost full cooperation in P. Cooperation is surprisingly stable and even continues when the 
community grows large – in fact, in the end almost all subjects join P.
3 The high contribution 
levels render punishment unnecessary and almost full efficiency is achieved.  
                                                 
2  Founding entrepreneurs, for example, have a very strong influence on the culture of the organization they 
create (Edgar H. Schein 2004). 
3  These observations are well in line with a previous study by Özgür Gürerk et al. (2006) in which the choice 
between a punishment-and-reward-institution and one with no sanctioning is investigated. We will discuss this 
study in more detail in Section 5.    4
How can we explain the evident success of the VF choice between P and N? We observe that 
in almost all sessions the P communities start off with only one third of the subjects, but grow 
large over time and ultimately reach almost 100 percent of the total population. This 
observation leaves room for two non-exclusive explanations. The VF choice allows for “self-
selection” of the community members into the preferred institution and due to the different 
nature of the institutions – with and without punishment possibilities – the selection may be 
driven by different predispositions to cooperate. Particularly in the beginning, this selection 
process of like-minded people (Armin Falk et al. 2003, Gächter and Christian Thöni 2005) 
may initiate and foster a culture of high levels of cooperation in the punishment community. 
Later on, others with less cooperative attitudes might also be attracted simply by the success 
of the cooperative culture in P. A second explanation which is independent from the “self-
selection” argument is that a group that starts small and grows slowly can coordinate better 
than a group that already starts at “full size”. Evidence pointing into this direction is presented 
by Roberto A. Weber (2006), who finds that a slow growth path improves coordination in a 
coordination game.
4  
To disentangle these two possible explanations for the success of the VF mechanism, we 
report two additional control experiments. In the first control experiment, we simulate the 
same growth paths as they endogenously occurred in our main study VF, but we exogenously 
allocate subjects to the two institutions in each period. Hence institution allocations do not 
emerge from self-selection, but are exogenously imposed by the experimenter. We refer to 
this experiment as GX (growing groups with exogenous allocation). The comparison shows 
that contribution rates in GX are significantly lower than in VF indicating that self-selection 
of subjects plays a crucial role for the superior performance of the VF mechanism. A second 
control experiment eliminates the effects of an increasing growth path. Subjects are 
exogenously allocated into fixed-sized communities in which they remain for the entire 
experiment. We refer to this experiment as FX (fixed size groups with exogenous allocation). 
Contrasting FX with GX allows studying the impact of growing communities. The results of 
FX do not differ significantly from GX, neither in contributions nor in efficiency. This 
indicates that starting with a small group of subjects (and growing afterwards) does not per se 
foster high contributions. Instead, it seems that the group has to be composed of the “right” 
                                                 
4  Note that if one assumes selfish preferences we do not have a coordination game since each participant has a 
dominant strategy to free-ride. However, if one considers the participants to have social preferences, 
coordination on one of several Pareto-ranked equilibria might be necessary (see our analysis in section 2).   5
subjects, who initially establish a cooperative environment through high contributions and 
rigid punishment. In our VF mechanism these subjects find their way into the P community 
quite early since they do not have to fear punishment. Hence, our findings suggest that the 
endogenous choice is key for the observed extremely high levels of cooperation. The self-
selection of cooperative subjects (including some with a predisposition to punish defectors) 
into the punishment community and their success in establishing a cooperative culture despite 
initial personal payoff disadvantages seems to be the main driving force in VF. 
In the next section, we introduce our model and section 2 provides predictions on community 
choice behavior. Section 3 deals with our experimental design and procedures. In section 4, 
we present the results and compare our findings to the two control experiments. Section 5, 
relates our findings to the literature, and section 6 concludes. 
1.  Community choice by voting with one’s feet 
In our model, twelve players choose between the two communities before interacting in a 
voluntary contributions situation with others who have chosen the same community. The non-
punishment community (N) resembles the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. In the 
punishment community (P), players may additionally engage in costly punishment of other 
players after having observed their contributions. We consider a three-stage game consisting 
of a “voting with feet” stage (S0), a voluntary contribution stage (S1) and a punishment stage 
(S2).  
1.1.  “Voting with feet” stage (S0) 
In S0 all twelve members of the population simultaneously choose one of the two 
communities N and P. Once all choices are completed, each player is informed about the 
number of players   n ,  } , { P N   , who have chosen the same community. Since the total 
number of players is common information, the size of the population of the other community 
is easily inferable. Notice that only the number of players and not their identities or histories 
of their play are revealed. 
1.2.  Contribution stage (S1) 
In S1, a player i interacts only with those players who have chosen the same community. 
Each player is endowed with 20 monetary units (tokens) and may contribute an integer 
amount of  i g  (2 0 0   i g ) to a joint project. Players decide simultaneously on their own   6
contribution. The amount not contributed remains in the player’s private account.
5 The sum of 




j j g G
1 is multiplied by   a  (with  1 / 1     a n ) and then consumed 
by each player, independent of the individual contribution  i g . The marginal per capita return 
(MPCR)   a  – the return of each player from her own and others’ contributions – depends on 
the community size   n . In order to give smaller communities the potential to be as productive 
as larger ones, we keep the productivity   a n R   constant for different group sizes by setting 
6 . 1    a n R . Thus, the return from the joint project for a player does not vary in   n  if all 
members of a community symmetrically contribute a certain amount. As a consequence   a  is 
a decreasing function in   n , as shown in Table 1.
6  
Table 1: Marginal per capita return aθ 
Community size nθ  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
Marginal per capita return aθ  0.80 0.53 0.40 0.32 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.13 
 
After all players have taken their contribution decisions, they are informed about the 
individual contributions of each member in their own community, again without revealing 
identities. 
1.3.  Punishment stage (S2) 
In S2 each player receives 20 additional monetary units independent of her community 
affiliation and her contribution in S1. Providing players in N with the same additional 
endowment eliminates incentives to choose P just for receiving the extra tokens from S2. For 
the members of N, in this period the game ends here. The total monetary payoff of player i in 
N is 
(1)   20 20     N N i
N
i G a g x . 
                                                 
5  If only a single player joins a community, no joint project can be created and the total endowment of the player 
is automatically transferred to her private account. Therefore, this player has no decision in stages S1 and S2. 
6  Mark Isaac and James Walker (1988) examine the effects of different MPCRs in public goods experiments. 
They find significantly more free-riding behavior in their low MPCR treatment (0.30) than in the high MPCR 
condition (0.75). This suggests that in our setting cooperation is harder if a community grows large. Of course 
this observation emerges from a static comparison between treatments and does not reflect a dynamic change of 
the MPCR within a population.   7
In P all players simultaneously decide whether or not to punish other members of their 
community. All players are provided with the same punishment capacity, which is 
independent of their contributions  i g  in S1. In total, each player may assign up to 20 tokens.
7 
Player i can punish community member j by assigning punishment tokens  ij t . Each token 
assigned by player i to player j incurs a cost of 1 token for player i and reduces the payoff of 
player j by 3 tokens. Thus, the marginal cost of punishment is  3 / 1  c .
8 Let 
i T  denote the 
amount of tokens that player i assigns and 
i T
  denote the amount of tokens that player i 
receives from the other community members. The total monetary payoff of player i in P 
results in 




i T T G a g x
       3 20 20 . 
The expressions in parentheses represent the stage payoffs of S1 and S2, respectively. After 
S2 is completed, all players are informed about all other players’ contributions, their 
punishment tokens assigned, their punishment tokens received and their resulting total 
payoffs. We model an open information flow between both communities, i.e., at the end of 
each period, members of P are informed about the contributions and payoffs in N and 
members of N receive the same information about P as members of P do. The game described 
so far is repeated 30 times (periods) involving the same twelve subjects.
9 
2.  Theoretical Predictions 
While in the N-community, full contributions by all players would be socially optimal, 
contributing zero is the dominant strategy for money-maximizing players (independent of the 
group size  N n ). Thus, in the unique Nash equilibrium, each player free-rides and earns 40 
tokens. Full contribution of each player (i.e.,  20  i g ) maximizes the joint payoff of the 
community and each player’s payoff equals 52 tokens, again independent of the group size 
                                                 
7  It is worth noting that the threat of punishment is likely to be heavier in larger communities, as in total there 
are more punishment tokens available. 
8  This means it costs 1/3 token to reduce another player’s income by 1 token. For punishment, the applied cost-
to-effect ratio of 1:3 reflects that in general punishing someone is less costly than being punished (cf. Klaus 
Abbink et al. 2000, and Fehr and Gächter 2002). With a punishment leverage of 1:3, the punisher can reduce the 
absolute inequality in payoffs to his own disadvantage since punishment reduces the income of the punished 
player more than the own income is diminished.  
9  In our experiment, we consider a special case of a partner design in which not all members of the group 
necessarily interact in each period. For an investigation of the differences in behavior of strangers and partners in 
social dilemma situations, see, e.g., Croson (1996) or Claudia Keser and Frans van Winden (2000).   8
N n . In P, a purely money-maximizing player will not punish in S2 since it is costly to do so. 
Rational players foresee this and refrain from contributing in S1. Hence, independent of  P n , 
players do not contribute and do not punish in the subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this case 
the total payoff is 40 tokens. As in N, the joint payoff is maximized and each player’s payoff 
is 52 tokens when all community members fully cooperate. Thus, in a world of money-
maximizing rational actors, a player is indifferent between N and P because in equilibrium 
identical payoffs of 40 will be achieved. Since our interaction is finite, backward induction 
suggests that in our repeated setting, players will also neither contribute nor punish. 
Let us now assume that (at least some) players are not exclusively motivated by their own 
monetary payoffs, but have other-regarding preferences; as modeled, for example, in Fehr and 
Klaus M. Schmidt (1999). They suggest a utility function where player i weights inequality in 
payoffs to her disadvantage with a parameter  i   and inequality in payoffs to her advantage 
with a parameter  i  . They assume  1 0   i   and  i i    . If  ) ,..., ( 1  n x x x   denotes the 
vector of the individual monetary payoffs of the   n  community members, player i’s utility is 
described by 
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  . 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) apply their model to a public goods setting with voluntary 
contributions and show that equilibria may exist in which conditional cooperators contribute 
strictly positive amounts to the public good.
10 In a first step, we consider the two communities 
N and P separately and examine the conditions for equilibria with positive levels of 
cooperation. In a second step, we extend this analysis by discussing the dynamics inherent in 
the endogenous choice process. 
The analysis of the static consideration of the two communities is an extension of Fehr and 
Schmidt’s examination, taking the varying community sizes into account. Adapting Fehr and 
Schmidt’s original analysis to our model, we can show that players who are not sufficiently 
averse to advantageous inequality (i.e., players with parameters  N i n R/ 1   ) never 
                                                 
10  A “conditional cooperator” is a player who reduces his disutility from advantageous inequality by 
contributing himself if other players also contribute. A necessary condition for tolerating some free-riders in a 
community without punishment is that the suffering from disadvantageous payoff inequality is not too high cf. 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Proposition 4 (c), p. 839.   9
contribute to the public good when punishment is absent, as in our N community. In addition, 
when the productivity parameter R < 2, as it is the case in our experimental parameterization 
as well as in the vast majority of similar experiments,  we can show that in the N community, 
equilibria with positive contributions exist if and only if all players i are sufficiently averse to 
advantageous inequality, i.e.,  N i n R / 1    for  N n i ,..., 1  . In all these equilibria, all players 
contribute the same amount. Thus, when R < 2, we can be sure that there is no equilibrium 
with positive cooperation levels in N, if there is at least one single player who is not 
sufficiently averse to advantageous inequality (i.e.,  N i n R/ 1   ). The proof of these 
statements is given in Appendix B (Proposition 1). In our experimental parameterization the 
lower bound for  i   necessary to enable cooperation in equilibrium varies between 0.20 (for 
2  N n ) and 0.87 (for  12  N n ) and thus becomes the more demanding, the larger the 
community is. Fehr and Schmidt propose an average  315 . 0    and according to empirical 
estimations of the inequality aversion parameters (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, p. 844; and 
Mariana Blanco et al. 2008), it is almost impossible to observe  -values that are sufficiently 
high to allow cooperation in larger communities. Thus, equilibria with positive contributions 
are highly unlikely in N. 
In their analysis of institutions with punishment possibilities, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
assume, for the sake of simplicity, that all players are of one of two types: enforcers who 
conditionally cooperate and are ready to punish deviators or payoff maximizers with inequity 
parameters 0     . The adaptation of Fehr and Schmidt’s model to the P community 
shows that equilibria with positive contributions exist if some players suffer sufficiently from 
disadvantageous inequality and credibly threaten to punish free-riders. In these equilibria, all 
players contribute an identical amount. We extend the analysis of Fehr and Schmidt and show 
that under reasonable assumptions equilibria with positive contributions can only exist if the 
number of payoff maximizers in P is low. To be precise, the number of payoff maximizers has 
to be strictly lower than the multiplicative inverse of the marginal punishment costs  c / 1 . In 
our setting with  3 / 1  c  this implies that the P community can “afford” at most two payoff 
maximizers. If more than two payoff maximizers join P, no equilibrium with positive 
contribution levels exists and, interestingly, this is true independent of the community size 
P n . This means that no matter how many members join P, more than two payoff maximizers 
destroy the possibility of an equilibrium with positive contributions. If there are no enforcers 
in P who threaten to punish the non-contributors, the situation is “equivalent” to the situation   10
in N described above: equilibria with positive contributions only exist if all players are 
conditional cooperators with  P i n R / 1   , regardless how large the community size  P n  is. 
A detailed analysis of this result is given in Appendix B, Proposition 2 and Corollary 1.  
What does the Fehr-Schmidt model suggest for the dynamic case of voting-by-feet choice? 
Conditional cooperators who sufficiently dislike disadvantage inequality are likely to choose 
P because this gives them the possibility to punish free-riders. In P they might be able to 
sustain an equilibrium in which all players contribute. Hence the punishment possibility may 
well serve as a coordination device for conditional cooperators to gather in P. If conditional 
cooperators vote with their feet for P, cooperation payoffs would likely be higher in P than in 
N. This could attract other players to join P. However, with a growing community size, 
punishing a non-cooperator becomes less attractive, since although it would equalize payoffs 
towards the punished player, it would in fact increase the inequality towards the (many) 
players who contributed, but do not punish. For both communities, the chances of the 
existence of a cooperation-equilibrium tend to diminish the larger the community size is or 
becomes over time. Thus, even when one assumes that players are inequity averse it is highly 
unlikely that cooperation emerges in our population of 12 players.  
3.  Experimental Design and Procedure 
Subjects were recruited for voluntary participation via the online recruitment system ORSEE 
(Ben Greiner 2004) and were randomly allocated to treatments. None of them had participated 
in a similar experiment before. On arrival, subjects were informed about the experimental 
procedure as well as the number of periods.
11 The experiment was programmed with z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007) and conducted in the computerized laboratory eLab at the University of 
Erfurt. Random reshuffling of the presentation order on the computer screens ensured that the 
identity of the players could not be traced over periods. In total 264 subjects participated, i.e., 
we collected 22 independent observations (8 in VF, 8 in GX, and 6 in FX) with 12 subjects 
each. An experimental session lasted for about 2 to 2.5 hours. Subjects’ earnings were 
between 15 and 25 Euro. 
                                                 
11  A translation of the instruction sheet is given in Appendix. Original instructions were written in German. 
They are available upon request from the authors.   11
4.  Results 
4.1.  Results of the voting with feet experiment 
As shown in Figure 1, over time an initially low acceptance rate of P steadily increases. While 
in the first period, on average roughly 4 out of 12 subjects choose P, in the last period this is 
the case for on average 11 subjects.
12 Figure 1 also shows that contributions in P of VF 
increase throughout the experiment. Compared with the first half, contributions in the second 
half increase significantly (p = 0.008). The most striking result, however, is that the P-
communities establish and maintain almost perfect cooperation. Although the communities 
are quite large in the second half (about 9 to 12 players) and consequently the MPCR is 
relatively low, members of P contribute on average 19.5 tokens (while the average 
contribution in N is 3.4 tokens). This is especially noteworthy since previous studies (c.f.  
Isaac and Walker 1988) indicate that cooperation is much more difficult to establish if the 
community size is high and the MPCR is low.
13 Interestingly, in the last period 87 out of 88 
subjects in P contribute the maximum amount of 20 tokens and the remaining one contributes 
19 tokens. Hence, we do not observe an endgame effect in P of VF; in contrast the 
contributions even rise in the final period. 
Community choice, contributions and punishment in the initial periods 
The majority of subjects are initially reluctant to join P.
14 In the first period, significantly 
more subjects choose N (68.8%) than P (32.2%, binomial test, p < 0.0001). Yet, initial 
contributions in P (13.2 tokens) are significantly higher than the first period contributions in 
N (7.4 tokens) (p < 0.0001). Subjects with cooperative predispositions seem to self-select into 
P: In P 53.3% of the initial contributions are high contributions (g ≥ 15) while only 20.0% of 
subjects contribute very low (g ≤ 5). In N the distribution of contributions is quite different; 
while 45.5% contribute low only 15.2% contribute high. 
                                                 
12  In each of the 8 independent observations of VF, the group size of N, nN, has a negative trend over time 
(determined by Spearman-rank-correlation coefficients). Hence a binomial test with these correlation 
coefficients clearly rejects that a negative trend is as likely as a positive trend (p = 0.016). All non-parametric 
statistical tests reported in this paper are two-tailed if not stated otherwise and take communities as units of 
independent observations. Comparisons within a treatment are tested with the Wilcoxon matched pairs tests. 
Comparisons across treatments are performed with the Whitney Mann U-tests. 
13  Jeffrey Carpenter (2007) observes that cooperation is not necessarily reduced with an increasing group size if 
mutual monitoring and punishment possibilities are available.  
14  This result is in line with Matthias Sutter et al. (2009), who let participants vote by unanimity rule whether 
they prefer a punishment institution, a reward institution, or an institution with no sanctions at all. For a detailed 
discussion, see section 5.   12
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Subjects who initially choose P are not only highly cooperative but additionally ready to 
punish defectors. Already in the first period 87.5% of the high contributors (14 subjects) exert 
punishment tokens to discipline “less-contributors”, i.e., subjects who contributed strictly less 
than themselves. In the first five periods, subjects in P punish less-contributors in 80.6% of all 
possible cases. Subjects receive more punishment tokens the more they deviate from the 
community average.
15  
Behavior of incoming subjects to P 
Subjects in the N community might be attracted by the high contributions in P. But at the 
same time they realize that the costs from punishing low-contributors may compromise the 
benefits from high cooperation. In fact, in the first half of the experiment the payoffs in P are 
slightly but not significantly lower than the payoffs in N (p = 0.148). The high initial 
contributions in P are “eaten up” by the high expenses for punishing those who contribute 
low.
16 Thus, contributing high and simultaneously free-riding on the punishment addressed to 
low contributors might seem appealing for incomers to P. It spares them from being punished 
                                                 
15  All Spearman-rank-correlation-coefficients computed for each independent observation are positive. A 
binomial test with these correlation coefficients rejects that a negative correlation is as likely as a positive 
correlation (p = 0.016). 
16  This observation is in line with previous research (Martin Sefton et al. 2007, Fehr and Gächter 2002).   13
and “saves” the money for disciplining free-riders. Indeed, we observe that 76.3% of the 
subjects increase their contributions after switching from N to P.
17 46.4% of the subjects 
switching from N to P are low contributors in N, but contribute  15  g  after the change to P. 
Moreover, 17.9% even “convert” from a complete free-rider to a full cooperator by increasing 
their contributions from 0 to 20 after the change to P. About two-thirds (65.6%) of incomers 
in P abstain from punishing in the very same period in which they enter P. Incoming subjects 
who contribute high but do not punish earn significantly more than they did in N before the 
change (average payoffs increase from 40.1 to 49.1, p = 0.016), while incoming subjects who 
contribute high and punish in P immediately after the change earn significantly less in the first 
period after the change in P than they did in N before the change (average payoffs decrease 
from 40.4 to 35.4, p = 0.016). There is no significant decrease in the percentage of punishers 
when the community size  P n  increases.
18 Actually, for all community sizes  P n  at least 50% 
of subjects are punishers.
19 
Payoffs 
Punishment leads to increased contributions and higher “long-term” payoffs in P. In the 
second half of the periods the average payoff in P steadily increases towards the social 
optimum. The payoffs in the second half are significantly higher than in the first half 
(p  =  0.008). The payoffs in N, however, constantly remain low and approach the Nash-
equilibrium prediction in the end. In the second half of the experiment, payoffs in P (48.6 
tokens) are significantly higher (p = 0.016) than payoffs in N (41.3 tokens). 
Taking the perspective of a social planer one might be interested in the overall efficiency of 
the VF mechanism and ask for a joint evaluation of both communities. The overall efficiency 
(i.e., the sum of the players’ gains from contributions reduced by their punishment expenses) 
                                                 
17  We calculate the difference between the subject’s contribution in period t and the contribution of that subject 
in period t -1 conditional upon the subject changed the community from period t -1 to period t. 
18  The burden of punishing is shared: 92 out of 95 subjects who inhabit P face at least one time a less-
contributor in their community. In such a situation, 81.5% of them punish a less-contributor at least once, 69.6% 
punish more than once in such a situation. More than half of the subjects (55.4%) even punish 5 or more times. 
19  Incomers to N typically (66.8% of subjects) decrease their contributions after the change from P to N. 15.3% 
switch even from full cooperation to complete free-riding. This observation is well in line with the experimental 
findings by Falk et al. (2009). They show that the contribution behavior of subjects is influenced by social 
interactions with their “neighbors”. Subjects who simultaneously belong to two different groups with disjoint 
group compositions exhibit conditionally cooperative behavior, i.e., the same subject contributes more if she is 
in a community with high contributors, but contributes less if she is in a community with low contributors. Note, 
however, that in our experiment subjects know that the members of one “neighborhood” can punish while those 
of the other cannot.   14
of the VF mechanism is low initially (74% of the possible maximum in periods 1-15), but 
steadily increases and reaches 94% in periods 16-30. These figures are remarkably high and 
can hardly be found in other public goods experiments with or without sanctioning 
possibilities. 
What makes the VF mechanism so successful? In the light of our results, two explanations are 
at hand. The first is that self-selection into communities is key for success. It allows the 
subjects to join in groups of “like-minded” people and to establish a cooperative “culture” in 
P. The other non-exclusive explanation is the growth process of the P community, i.e., the 
mere fact that the community starts off with a small group of subjects and then grows to its 
maximum size. To investigate and to disentangle these two possible explanations we ran two 
control experiments, which will be described and discussed in the two following sections. 
4.2.  The effect of self-selection  
We designed a control experiment with identical growth paths as in our main experiment VF, 
but without the possibility of self-selection. Instead, we exogenously allocated subjects to the 
communities. We refer to this experiment as the exogenous growth experiment (abbreviated 
GX). In this experiment, there was no community choice stage. Instead, all community choice 
vectors of subjects who participated in one session of the VF-experiment were randomly 
assigned to participants in one session of the GX-experiment. Technically, each session in GX 
exactly re-ran the community choices of the “mirror”-session in VF. We conducted 8 
additional sessions with 12 new subjects each. Subjects were told that community affiliations 
may vary from period to period and will be announced privately at the beginning of a period. 
In VF initial contributions are higher and punishment is more severe 
Initial contributions in P of VF (13.2 tokens) are significantly higher (p = 0.003) than initial 
contributions in P of GX (8.7 tokens) (cf. Figure 1). In contrast to VF, the first period 
contributions in P and N are quite similar in GX. In both N and P of GX, only 16.7% 
contribute high while 43.3% contribute low in P and 59.1% in N. Compared to VF, the initial 
punishment behavior also differs in GX. In the first period, we observe only one subject who 
contributes high and punishes a less-contributor. This is significantly less than in VF where 
14 subjects are high contributors and punish less contributors (p = 0.004). In the first five 
periods in P of GX subjects punish others who contributed less in 44.1% of the cases (P of 
VF: 80.6%, p = 0.005). Hence, the disciplining subjects in P of VF are not only more   15
numerous than in P of GX, but they show also less mercy against defectors. These findings 
support the positive influence of the self-selection process on cooperation in the beginning 
phase of VF. 
The impact of endogenous choice on incoming subjects to P in later periods 
In GX 70.0% of subjects increase their contribution after switching from N to P (in VF: 
76.3%). The incoming subjects in P of GX, however, increase their contributions less than 
subjects in the same situation in VF do (average increase in P of GX: 5.6 tokens, in P of VF: 
10.3 tokens, p = 0.028). Only 6.7% of the subjects in P of VF who are punished in period t-1 
but choose to remain in P in period t, decrease their contributions. These are significantly 
fewer (p = 0.062) than in GX (15.6%) where the decision to remain in P is predetermined. If 
the subjects, who have been punished in period t-1 and stay in P, increase their contributions 
in period t, then this increase is significantly lower (p = 0.065) in P of GX (on average 3.6 
tokens) than the increase (5.3 tokens) in P of VF. On average, a punisher in P of GX 
contributes significantly less (p = 0.005) than a punisher in P of VF (11.1 versus 17.7 tokens). 
As a consequence, in the second half of the experiment, payoffs in P of GX are significantly 
lower than payoffs in P of VF (p = 0.099). 
Figure 2: Average contributions in P of VF and P of GX 
each diamond represents the average 
contributions of the two sessions sharing 
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Figure 2 relates the average contribution of each P-community in VF to the average 
contribution of its “mirror” community in GX with identical (but exogenously imposed) 
growth-path. While the variability in contributions is low in P of VF (variance: 0.83) there is a   16
huge difference in the variability of average contributions in P of GX (variance: 35.9). 
Overall, subjects in P of VF contribute significantly more than subjects in P of GX (18.7 
tokens versus 11.0 tokens; p = 0.016). There is no significant difference between the overall 
contributions in N of VF (3.6 tokens) and in N of GX (3.9 tokens). Hence, the self selection of 
subjects into the communities seems to be not only initially relevant, but a crucial determinant 
of the success of the VF mechanism throughout the interaction. 
4.3.  The effect of community growth 
Another characteristic of VF is the steady growth of the P communities, from a minority to 
the entire population. To study the pure effect of this community growth on cooperation we 
conducted a second control experiment with fixed sized communities (abbreviated FX). In 
this control experiment, we also involved 12 (new) subjects and again there was no 
community choice stage. Instead, in each of the 6 sessions we created two equally sized 
communities (P and N) consisting of 6 members each. The community compositions were 
fixed for the whole duration of the sessions. Comparing FX to GX provides us with insights 
about the impact of the community growth on cooperation. 
First period contributions between P of GX and P of FX are not statistically different 
(p = 0.564). The same is true for N of GX and N of FX (p = 0.169). Also overall contributions 
between P and N-communities of GX and of FX are not significantly different (p = 0.414 and 
p = 0.513, respectively). Within each experiment, contributions in P are significantly higher 
than in N (VF: p = 0.008, GX: p = 0.008, and FX: p = 0.031, respectively). 
With respect to punishing of less-contributors there is no significant difference between P of 
GX and P of FX (p  =  0.470) in the first five periods. Overall, there is no difference in 
contribution behavior of punishers between GX and FX (p = 0.491). In the first half, there is 
no difference between payoffs in P of GX and payoffs in P of FX (p = 1.000). In the second 
half, however, payoffs in P of FX are higher than payoffs in P of GX (p = 0.087). The result 
that we do not observe higher cooperation in P of GX than in P of FX suggests that the effect 
of a P community that starts small and increases steadily is not substantial.
20 The main effect 
of the superior performance of the VF mechanism seems to be due to self selection of subjects 
into different communities rather than their growth. 
                                                 
20  It might well be that a possible advantage of growing slowly in GX might be canceled out by a possible 
advantage of having a fixed group composition in FX (which arguably makes it easier to sustain cooperation). 
We do not have indications pointing into this direction.   17
4.4.  Societies performances – from a social planner’s point of view 
Taking again the perspective of a social planner, we consider the efficiency of the entire 
mechanism with both communities N and P. Over 30 periods and both communities, the 
contributions in VF are significantly higher than in GX (p  =  0.038) as well as in FX 
(p  =  0.029). The contributions in GX and FX are not significantly different (p = 0.662). 
Hence, also from a social planner’s perspective VF outperforms GX and FX. The payoffs in 
the second half of the periods are significantly higher in VF than the payoffs in GX 
(p = 0.098) and almost significantly higher than the payoffs in FX (p = 0.108).
21 Hence, in 
terms of efficiency, VF exhibits the best long-run performance. Although we do not have hard 
evidence the trend in payoffs suggests that the payoff differences between VF and the other 
two experiments would have been even more pronounced had the experiment been continued 
(cf. Gächter et al. 2008). 
5.  Related Literature 
Recently a modest experimental literature on endogenous choice in social dilemma situations 
has emerged. One line of research investigates the endogenous choice of interaction partners 
in public goods settings
22, and another strand focuses on institution choice through voting. 
To the best of our knowledge Karl-Martin Ehrhart and Keser (1999) are the first to use 
endogenous regrouping in a public goods experiment. They allow subjects to move freely 
from one group to another. In each group and period a simple public goods game (without 
punishment) is played. The MPCR is decreasing in the group size but a contribution to the 
public good in a larger group yields a higher group return than in a smaller group. They find 
that high contributors are chased by free riders. This results in an unstable sorting of high and 
low contributors and over time in a declining trend of contributions. Giorgio Coricelli et al. 
(2004) let subjects bid for the right to choose partners. As in Ehrhart and Keser (1999), in 
their unidirectional choice treatment free riders show a tendency to chase high contributors 
which leads to higher contributions than with random re-matching. Talbot Page et al. (2005) 
regroup subjects after each third period according to their expressed preferences. This 
                                                 
21  The comparison between VF and FX might be considered not to be completely fair since in our setting the 
MPCR decreases with the community size which makes cooperation easier in smaller communities than in larger 
ones. While the majority of players join P in the last periods of VF, the community sizes in FX are fixed to 6. 
22  Partner selection and its effects on behavior are also explored in market interactions (Georg Kirchsteiger et al. 
2005, and Martin Brown et al. 2004), and networks (Arno M. Riedl and Aljaz Ule 2003). Esther Hauk and 
Rosemarie Nagel (2001) study the pure effect of unilateral and mutual choice of partners in finitely repeated 
prisoners’ dilemma games.   18
regrouping procedure increased contributions, both in a simple public goods setting and also 
in a public goods setting with punishment. In Matthias Cinyabuguma et al. (2005), subjects 
vote on irreversibly excluding others. Subjects who are not expelled contribute highly. Over 
time more and more subjects are banished which leads to a decrease in social efficiency. In a 
study by Gary Charness and Chun Lei-Yang (2008), subjects can decide whether they want to 
exit a group, to exclude other players by majority vote, or to merge with other groups (if 60% 
of the merging groups’ members accept) before they play a public goods game. The greater 
the group size, the higher is the marginal social value, i.e., greater groups are more 
productive. Opportunities of regrouping together with the increase in the marginal social 
value raise contributions substantially. The increase in contributions, however, is smaller 
when the marginal social value is capped at a certain group size. Toh-Kyeong Ahn et al. 
(2008) also investigate the group formation under different rules: free entry and exit into a 
group, restricted (free) entry into and free (restricted) exit from a group. In the restricted entry 
and exit treatments, a majority vote decides on the entry and exit wish. Ahn et al. (2008) do 
not find significant differences between overall contributions. The different treatments, 
however, lead to groups of different sizes. Restricted entry leads to mid-sized and more 
effective groups while restricted exit and free entry/exit treatments lead to rather large and 
uncooperative groups. In all these studies subjects include or exclude interaction partners in 
static institutional settings. In contrast, in our voting with feet mechanism subjects do not 
actively choose their interaction partners, but opt for different institutions, that allow or do not 
allow for punishment. This at best allows for an indirect choice of interaction partners since 
choosing an institution means to interact with “likeminded” individuals in the sense that all 
have chosen the same institution. Additionally, in contrast to our study, in the mentioned 
studies productivities of groups increase with their size which is likely to make cooperation 
easier in larger groups. 
Few studies focus on situations in which institution choice is the result of a voting process. 
Thorsten Decker et al. (2003) let subjects vote for different punishment mechanisms. After 
observing others’ contributions, subjects individually submit their intended punishment level 
for each of the other three group members. Whether the highest, the medium, or the lowest 
punishment level should be applied is auctioned off in a first-price auction. Subjects prefer the 
rule implementing the lowest of the proposed punishment levels which can be interpreted as 
unanimity vote on punishment, i.e., all agree that the respective player should be punished as 
least as much as the lowest suggested level. Arhan Ertan et al. (2009) allow subjects to   19
interact in non-punishment and punishment institutions before they decide by majority vote 
whether punishment shall be available in a future interaction and if yes to whom it can be 
directed. Many groups opt to restrict punishment against high contributors but allow 
punishment of low contributors. These groups achieve higher levels of cooperation than 
groups with unrestricted or no punishment. Stephan Kroll et al. (2007) let subjects vote on a 
non-binding minimum contribution. This mechanism alone, however, turns out not to be 
effective. Only if contributions below the non-binding minimum contribution can be punished 
or the minimum contribution becomes binding, contributions go up. In all three studies, 
players are not allowed repeatedly to choose to play the public goods game under different 
institutions so that self-selection into different institutions cannot occur. 
Three studies on the endogenous formation of institutions are most related to ours. Michael 
Kosfeld et al. (2009) let players decide whether they are willing to participate in a sanctioning 
organization. All participants who declare their willingness to join the organization have to 
vote by unanimity rule whether the organization is actually implemented or not. If the 
organization is implemented, members are sanctioned for not contributing their full 
endowment. Outsiders of the organization are not sanctioned but nevertheless benefit from the 
contributions of all players. The data shows that a large majority of groups implement an 
organization by the final periods, despite the fact that it is costly. About 75% of these 
organizations even involve all players. A comparison with control treatments reveals that the 
opportunity to form organizations enhances group welfare by higher and stabilized 
contributions. Our approach is different in several aspects. First, we implement a setting in 
which punishment is decentralized. Therefore, our results do not rely on the creation of a 
global organization. Second, our public goods are local in the sense that players benefit from 
each others’ contributions only within the same institution. Players joining different 
institutions play different public goods games. 
Sutter et al. (2009) systematically investigate the effects of institution choice by voting 
between standard public goods, public goods with rewards, or public goods with punishment. 
Voting is costly, but not mandatory. Those who choose to vote repeat voting until they reach 
an unanimous decision. The vote determines the institution, under which all individuals 
subsequently have to interact for 10 periods, i.e., play includes also those players who decided 
not to vote. In different treatments the leverages, i.e., effectiveness, for punishment and 
rewards are varied. For comparison, “exogenous treatments” are also conducted, in which one   20
of the institutions is exogenously imposed by the experimenter. Sutter et al. (2009) find that 
the reward institution is chosen almost exclusively, particularly when rewards and punishment 
have a high leverage. The punishment institution is rarely chosen and only when the leverage 
is low. When it is selected, however, it is the most successful institution in eliciting high 
contributions. This is true in comparison with all other endogenously selected institutions, but 
also in comparison with all exogenously imposed institutions. The study by Sutter et al. 
(2009) analyzes choices between a larger variety of institutions, while we are more interested 
in the dynamic aspects of a voting with feet mechanism. Thus, we focus on two institutions, a 
standard public goods setting and one with a high leverage punishment. Sutter et al. (2009) 
and Kosfeld et al. (2009) also differ in other respects from our approach. First, in their studies 
players cannot escape from each other, i.e., they are exogenously forced together to play the 
public goods game. We allow players to choose institutions every period which enables 
players to enter and exit. This leads to a dynamic evolution of the group composition. 
Thereby, we model an environment in which players have the freedom to escape, for example, 
if they are not satisfied with the institution or the treatment they receive from their respective 
partners. Secondly, we allow for a larger population which is three times as large as in the two 
other studies. Thus, in this respect we address a situation in which cooperation is particularly 
hard to achieve. Additionally, communities under each institution can grow endogenously and 
have a varying size and composition which is likely to make coordination on cooperative 
behavior even more difficult. 
Gürerk et al. (2006) investigate endogenous choice of institutions in a similar experimental 
setting, but with a different pair of communities than in this study. In Gürerk et al. (2006), 
participants had the choice between a community with punishment and reward possibilities, 
and a community with no sanction possibilities at all (as the N community in this study). The 
results show some qualitative similarities to this study, with respect to the dynamics of 
endogenous choice and the final cooperation level reached. The present study differs in 
various aspects. First, in Gürerk et al. (2006) it is not clear whether the observed cooperation 
is due to the interplay of punishment and reward or whether punishment alone also leads to 
high cooperation and efficiency levels. Second, the current study is designed to investigate 
reasons of the superior performance of endogenous choice mechanisms. The presented two 
control experiments allow us to investigate separately the effect of the endogenous choice 
from the effect of slow community growth.   21
6.  Summary and conclusion 
In this study, we investigate community choice in social dilemma situations. In our voting 
with feet setting (VF) – where subjects are given the choice between a non-punishment 
community (N) and a community with punishment possibilities (P) – most subjects initially 
choose N, but over time P becomes increasingly populated. In advanced periods, almost all 
subjects join P. Despite severe punishment in the beginning, P leads to high efficiency levels 
with full contributions of all participants and no punishment in later periods. In a control 
experiment (GX), we show that communities with exogenous subject allocation but identical 
growth paths as in VF perform significantly less successful. With the help of a second control 
experiment (FX) we find that growing communities per se are not more successful than fixed-
size ones, if subject allocation is exogenous. The synopsis of all three experiments suggests 
that the endogenous self-selection of subjects is an important key for the establishment and 
efficient maintenance of cooperation. In the beginning the punishment community P attracts 
the “right” subjects, willing to contribute high and ready to punish defectors. Although entry 
and exit is not restricted, they manage to establish high cooperation levels which sustain, even 
when the group grows large and the entire subject population ultimately joins P.  
Particularly the observed behavior in advanced periods cannot easily be expected from our 
theoretical analysis. With standard selfish and myopic preferences there should be no 
punishment and thus it is dominant to free-ride in both communities N and P. Also if one 
assumes that players are inequity-averse, cooperation is very unlikely. As we have shown, 
cooperation in N is only possible if all community members are conditional cooperators. To 
sustain cooperation in P, only very few payoff-maximizers can be coped with, even if all the 
others are ready to enforce cooperation by exerting costly punishment. In the experiment, the 
initial periods of the P community come relatively close to this situation. Only a small number 
of players self-select into P and very few of them contribute low. Those are heavily punished 
by high contributors. This seems to create and stabilize a “cooperative culture” in P that is 
also adopted by subjects switching to P later on, even if they have contributed almost nothing 
in N before. Although this comes close to what our adaption of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
model suggests for P, there is a remarkable difference in advanced periods: We observe far 
too many enforcers than could be expected from existing estimations of the inequity 
parameters (e.g. Blanco et al. 2008, Fehr and Schmidt 1999). These subjects, however, do not 
punish consistently all the time. It seems that they occasionally rely on others taking the 
burden of punishment. Nevertheless, free-riders have lower payoffs than both cooperators and   22
enforcers. 
Our findings emphasize and extend previous findings in several dimensions. They confirm the 
superior performance of punishment mechanisms by demonstrating that – also when subjects 
are free to enter and exit – efficiency of the punishment community in the advanced periods is 
significantly higher than without punishment. Efficiency in P under the voting with feet 
mechanism also turns out to be higher than when subjects are exogenously allocated to a P 
institution. It seems that if people vote with their feet to join an institution, they develop a 
certain degree of identification and commitment to the chosen community which in our 
setting induces newcomers in the P community – who have previously contributed nothing in 
the N community – not only to immediately contribute high but also to incur costs for 
punishing low contributors. This adoption of the established social norms of the chosen 
community helps to foster cooperation.
23 Thus, our findings highlight a so far undervalued 
feature of the voting with feet mechanism: In addition to the efficiency improvement from 
implementing the right match between consumers and public goods by the “consumer-voter 
[…] picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods” as 
suggested by Tiebout (1956), the adoption and thus the coordination on the existing norms in 
a new community improves efficiency even further if the community is joined voluntarily. 
This observation adds one essential piece to the puzzle why people often show such a 
surprisingly high willingness to cooperate in communities they have voluntarily joined, like 
companies, parties or jurisdictions. 
In our setting the P institution seems to serve at least two purposes. First it constitutes a 
coordination device to attract the more cooperative subjects. Since in the beginning the 
cooperative subjects predominantly self-select into P they are able to initiate a cooperative 
culture. Second, it provides the tools necessary to sustain the cooperative culture by 
disciplining low contributors. It is an open question whether both features are essential for the 
success of the voting-with feet mechanism. As shown by Ehrhart and Keser (1999) having the 
choice between different communities appears not to be sufficient, if the tools to discipline 
free-riders are not available. They allow subjects to choose between communities with 
identical rule systems (N). Thus, in the first place it is difficult for cooperators to coordinate 
                                                 
23  Sutter et al. (2009) report a similar observation. Subjects who choose to participate in the unanimity vote on 
the institutions (and are willing to exert some costs to do so) contribute more than those who abstain from 
voting. For a systematic overview of how participation in an institution may shape preferences, for example, by 
“conformist transmission”, see Bowles (1998).   23
on joining a certain community since the communities are not distinguishable. But our guess 
would be that even if one facilitates coordination, for example, by giving different names to 
different communities voting with feet would not be successful. The reason is that in addition 
to gathering in one community cooperators need a tool to discipline free-riders to successfully 
establish a cooperative culture.  
Our findings also raise questions for future research that are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Why are subjects initially reluctant to join P although it becomes so successful over time? 
Maybe some are hoping to find sufficiently many cooperative fellows in N so that cooperation 
would be possible without having to rely on punishment mechanisms? Or, do they simply fear 
the punishment? Switching to a different community is often not that easy. Thus, it would be 
informative to know how sensitive our findings are regarding the absence/existence of 
switching costs for joining a different community? What happens if individuals do not choose 
between exogenously given institutions, but instead are given the possibility to create their 
own alternative institutions? For feasibility reasons we concentrate on just two institutions. 
Introducing a larger variety of institutions would certainly come closer to Tiebout’s vision. 
How would a larger variety of institutions affect cooperation success of the voting with feet 
mechanism? Providing answers to these questions would be promising to help to design 
voting with feet institutions that further reduce the downsides inherent to social dilemmas.   24
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Appendix A: Instructions for the experiment (Treatment VF) 
General Information: At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned to 
one of 2 subpopulations each consisting of 12 participants. During the whole experiment, 
you will interact only with the members of your subpopulation. At the beginning of the 
experiment, 1000 experimental tokens will be assigned to the experimental account of each 
participant. 
Course of Action: The experiment consists of 30 rounds. Each round consists of 2 stages. In 
Stage 1, the group choice and the decision regarding the contribution to the project take place. 
In Stage 2, participants may influence the earnings of the other group members. 
Stage 1 
(i) The Group Choice: In Stage 1, each participant decides which group she wants to join. 
There are two different groups that can be joined: 
  Influence on the earnings of other group members
A: No 
Group 
B: Yes, by assigning negative points 
 
(ii) Contributing to the Project: In stage 1 of each round, each group member is endowed 
with 20 tokens. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you are going to contribute to 
the project. The remaining tokens will be kept by you. 
Calculation of your payoff in stage 1: Your payoff in stage 1 consists of two components: 
  tokens you have kept = endowment – your contribution to the project 
  earnings from the project = 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group members / 
number of group members 
Thus, your payoff in Stage 1 amounts to: 
20 – your contribution to the project 
     + 1.6x sum of the contributions of all group members / number of group members 
 
   29
The earnings from the project are calculated according to this formula for each group 
member. Please note: Each group member receives the same earnings from the project, i.e., 
each group member benefits from all contributions to the project. 
Stage 2 
Assignment of Tokens: In stage 2 it will be displayed how much each group member 
contributed to the project. (Please note: Before each round a display order will randomly 
be determined. Thus, it is not possible to identify any group member by her position on the 
displayed list throughout different rounds.) By the assignment of tokens you can reduce the 
payoff of a group member or keep it unchanged. 
In each round each participant receives additional 20 tokens in stage 2. You have to decide 
how many from the 20 tokens you are going to assign to other group members. The remaining 
tokens are kept by yourself. You can check the costs of your token assignment by pressing the 
button Calculation of Tokens. 
 Each negative token you assign to a group member reduces her payoff by 3 tokens. 
 If you assign 0 tokens to a group member her payoff won’t change.  
Calculation of your payoff in stage 2: Your payoff in stage 2 consists of two components: 
  tokens you kept = 20 – sum of the tokens that you have assigned to the other group 
members 
  less the threefold number of negative tokens you have received from other group 
members 
Thus, your payoff in Stage 2 amounts to:  
20 – sum of the tokens that you assigned to other group members 
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Calculation of your round payoff: Your round payoff is composed of 
 Your  payoff 
from Stage 1 
20 – your contribution to the project + 1.6 x sum of the contributions of 
all group members / number of group members 
+ Your  payoff 
from Stage 2 
20 – sum of the tokens that you have assigned to other group members 
       – 3 x (the number of tokens you have received from other group 
members 
=  Your round payoff 
 
Special case: a single group member: If it happens that you are the only member in your 
group you receive 20 tokens in Stage 1 and 20 tokens in Stage 2, i.e., your round payoff 
amounts to 40. You neither have to take any action on Stage 1 nor on Stage 2. 
Information at the end of the round: At the end of the round you receive a detailed 
overview of the results obtained in all groups. For every group member you are informed 
about her: Contribution to the project, payoff from the Stage 1, assigned tokens (if possible), 
received tokens (if possible), payoff from Stage 2, round payoff. 
History: Starting from the 2nd round, in the beginning of a new round you receive an 
overview of the average results (as above) of all previous rounds. 
Total Payoff: The total payoff from the experiment is composed of the starting capital of 
1000 tokens plus the sum of round payoffs from all 30 rounds. At the end of the experiment, 
your total payoff will be converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 € per 100 tokens. 
Please notice: Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment. If you have a 
question please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e., no 
other participant is informed about the identity of someone who made a certain decision. The 
payment is anonymous too, i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
We wish you success!   31
Appendix B: Theoretical Predictions (Intended for online publication only) 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) apply their model of inequity aversion to a public goods setting with 
voluntary contributions. They study the case in which no punishment is possible as well as the 
case with a punishment possibility. We adapt the results of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to our N 
and P communities where the MPCR depends on the community size and derive special 
results for our setting.  
Adaption of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) results to the N community 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that in a public goods setting with voluntary contributions and 
no punishment possibility contributing zero is a dominant strategy for players with 
1   i N a   (cf. the proof to the Proposition 4, part (a) in the Appendix of Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), p. 860). Since in our model the MPCR varies with the community size while the 
productivity of the public good is constant, i.e.,  N Na n R  , we replace  N a  by  N n R/ . Thus, 
for players with  1 /   i N n R   it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. In the 
following, we show that there is an equilibrium in N in which all players contribute zero and 
that equilibria with positive contributions exist only if all players are “conditional 
cooperators”, i.e., their preferences satisfy  1 /   i N n R  . 
Proposition 1. Assume that R < 2.  
I.  If for at least one player  1 /   i N n R   is satisfied, the unique equilibrium in N 
prescribes free-riding of all players.  
II.  Equilibria with strictly positive contributions exist if and only if all players i satisfy 
1 /   i N n R  . In all these equilibria, all players contribute the same amount. 
Proof.  
I.  In analogy to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that there are  N n  players in N with 
contributions 
N n g g g    ... 2 1  and k>0 of these  N n  players have  1 /   i N n R  . As 
mentioned above, for these k players it is a dominant strategy to contribute zero: 
0 1    k g g  . Suppose there exists a player  k l   who contributes the smallest 
positive amount 
N n l l l g g g g        ... 0 1 1 . Player l’s utility is given by   32
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The first three terms on the right-hand side of equation (A2) are equivalent to player l’s utility 
if she would deviate and contribute zero while the last three terms summarize the utility loss 
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Since  l l    ,  1   k l , and  1  l  , an upper bound for l’s utility from contributing is: 
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a deviation of player l to a contribution of zero is profitable. Equivalent transformation of 


























. Hence, if 
2 / R k   we can be sure that no equilibrium with strictly positive contributions exists. In 
other words, if the number of players k with  1 /   i N n R  , is at least  2 / R , all players 
contribute zero, independent of the community size  N n . If  2  R  (as in our experimental 
setting with R = 1.6) the presence of already one single player with  1 /   i N n R   prevents 
cooperation in N, independent of community size  N n .  
II.  It remains to be shown that in case all players have  1 /   i N n R   equilibria with 
strictly positive contributions exist and in all these equilibria, all players contribute the 
same amount. 
First we show that under the assumption that all players in N satisfy  1 /   i N n R   there 
exists a multiplicity of (pure strategy) equilibria in which all players contribute an identical 
amount of  } ... 0 { y gN   to the joint project. If all players contribute  N g , then player i has no 
incentive to deviate to a lower contribution  N i g g   since for her (by assumption) the 
monetary benefit of withholding 1 unit is lower (or equal) than the total loss from deviation 
i N n R   / . Player i has also no incentive to deviate to a higher contribution  N i g g   since in 
this case a contribution increase by 1 unit would cause a strictly positive utility loss of 
0 / 1    i N n R  . Thus, if all players contribute the same amount, no player has an incentive 
to deviate, neither to a higher nor to a lower contribution. 
Are there additional equilibria with non-identical contributions? Assume that there are two 
different contribution levels: l players contribute  0 
L g  while  ) ( l nN   players contribute 
L H g g  . A player j with  1 /   j N n R   is ready to increase her contribution if all other 
players contribute more than player j since for her the monetary benefit of withholding one 
monetary unit is lower (or equal) than her total loss in utility from deviation  j N n R   /.  
Thus, no player has an incentive to contribute less than 
L g . An analogous argument shows 
that no player has an incentive to contribute more than 
H g .   34
The situation with l players contributing 
L g  and  ) ( l nN   players contributing 
H g  can only 
be an equilibrium if the players contributing 
L g  have no incentive to increase their 
contributions towards 
H g  while the players contributing 
H g  should not have an incentive to 
decrease their contributions towards 
L g . In the following, we deduce the condition which has 
to be satisfied such that players with contributions 
H g  have no incentive to deviate to a lower 
contribution (Part A). Moreover, we deduce the condition which has to be satisfied such that 
players with contributions 
L g  have no incentive to deviate to a higher contribution (Part B). 
Part A. If a high contributor i deviates from 
H g  by reducing her contribution by , with 


















. If this 
term is negative then a deviation to a lower contribution is not profitable. The term is negative 
if and only if 
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This means that a high contributor does not decrease her contribution if the number of low 
contributors is not too high (cf. Fehr and Schmidt 1999, proof of Proposition 4 part c), p. 
862). 
Part B. If a low contributor i deviates from 
L g  by increasing her contribution by , with 





















If  this term is negative then a deviation is not profitable. The term is negative if and only if 
(A8) 
i i





    

/ 1 ) 1 / (
. 
Thus, a low contributor does not increase her contribution if the number of low contributors is 
not too low. 
Hence, strategy combinations with two groups of conditional cooperators contributing 
different amounts can only be part of an equilibrium if l satisfies both conditions (A7) and   35
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Because all players are assumed to have  0 1 /    i N n R   and  0 / 1   N n R  is satisfied in 
each public goods game, the lower bound of l is strictly greater than the upper bound of l. 
Hence, there is no l that satisfies (A9). This means that the situation with two groups of 
conditional cooperators who contribute different amounts cannot be part of an equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
Adaption of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) results to the P community (cf. Fehr and Schmidt 
1999, Proposition 5, p. 841): 
Proposition 2. Assume there are two types of players,  ' P n  “ conditional cooperative 
enforcers” (short: “enforcers”) with preferences that obey  1 /   i P n R   and 
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  for  } ' ,..., 1 { P n i  and  ) ' ( P P n n   players who are only 
interested in their own monetary payoff (short: “payoff maximizers”), i.e.,  0   j j    for all 
} ,..., 1 ' { P P n n j   . Then the following actions are part of a subgame perfect equilibrium in P:  
I.  On the equilibrium path all players contribute the same amount  ] 20 , 0 [  g  and no 
punishment occurs in the punishment stage. 
II.  If, off the equilibrium path, one of the payoff maximizers chooses  g g j   then each 
enforcer punishes the deviator with the punishment level  ) ' /( ) ( c n g g t P j ij     while 
all other players do not punish.  
Proof. By following backward induction reasoning, we first consider the punishment stage. 
Suppose that one of the payoff maximizers  } ,..., 1 ' { P P n n j    deviates and chooses  g g j  . 
We show that this deviator is punished by all enforcers with the punishment level  ij t as stated 
above and that this makes the deviation not profitable.   36
If in the punishment stage all enforcers choose a punishment level  ) ' /( ) ( c n g g t P j ij    , 
then deviator j obtains the same monetary payoff as each enforcer  } ' ,..., 1 { P n i . To see this 
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The right hand side of (A11) can be rewritten as 
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which demonstrates that the deviating payoff maximizer achieves the same payoff as each 
enforcer. This payoff, however, is strictly lower than the payoff of a payoff-maximizer who 
did not deviate and contributed g. Thus, given  ij t a deviation of a payoff maximizer to a lower 
contribution is not profitable. Obviously, a deviation to a higher contribution level is also not 
profitable.  
Now, we have to assure that enforcers’ punishment strategies are credible, i.e., that an 
enforcer does not have an incentive to unilaterally reduce her punishment  ij t . If an enforcer 
reduces  ij t  by   she saves  c   and experiences less disadvantageous inequality relative to the 
) 1 ' (   P P n n  non-enforcers. This creates a utility gain of  ) 1 /( ] ) 1 ' ( [    P P P i n c n n   . On the 
other hand, the enforcer also experiences disutility from the disadvantageous inequality with 
respect to the defector j and advantageous inequality with respect to the other  ) 1 (  P n  
enforcers who stick to the punishment  ij t . The disadvantageous inequality causes a utility loss 
of ) 1 /( ) 1 (   P i n c    whereas the advantageous inequality reduces the utility by 
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holds. One can easily show that (A13) is equivalent to 
(A14) 






    
  , 
i.e., the condition we assumed in the Proposition. Obviously, a deviation to a higher 
punishment level is also not profitable. It would cause a monetary loss, disadvantageous 
inequality with respect to the other enforcers, would increase the disadvantageous inequality 
with respect to the non-punishing contributors and would cause advantageous inequality with 
respect to the punished player. Hence, the punishment level  ) ' /( ) ( c n g g t P j ij    provides no 
incentives for deviation and is thus credible.  
Do enforcers have an incentive to deviate in the contribution stage? Suppose the deviating 
enforcer reduces her contribution by  0   . The deviator i gains   ) / 1 ( P n R   in monetary 
terms but she experiences a disutility of   i  from the advantageous inequality with respect to 
all other players. Since, by assumption,  i P n R    / 1  and since the player may additionally 
experience punishment in stage 2, this deviation does not pay. Hence, no enforcer deviates in 
the contribution stage either. On the other hand, choosing  g gi   is not profitable for any 
player either, since it reduces the monetary payoff and increases inequality. Q.E.D. 
Corollary 1. For the class of equilibria described in Proposition 2, enforcers can only exist if 
c n n P P / 1 ) ' (   , i.e., the number of payoff maximizers is strictly lower than the reciprocal 
value of the cost of punishing. 
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By contradiction we show that c n n P P / 1 ) ' (    has to be satisfied. Assume  c n n P P / 1 ) ' (   . 
Then (A15) would imply that  0
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 is always strictly positive for each of the  ' n  enforcers.   38
Hence  c n n P P / 1 ) ' (    has to be satisfied. Q.E.D. 
An intuition for this potentially unexpected implication is the following: By investing c in 
punishment, an enforcer reduces the monetary payoff of the deviator by exactly one unit, 
hence the inequality between the payoffs of the enforcer and the deviator decreases by  ) 1 ( c  , 
i.e., the enforcer’s disutility from being worse off than the deviator decreases exactly by 
) 1 )]( 1 /( [ c nP i    . At the same time, the enforcer creates a payoff inequality of c units with 
respect to each non-enforcer who contributes but does not punish. This means that the 
enforcer suffers from a disutility  c nP i )] 1 /( [    with respect to each non-enforcer; in sum 
c n n n P P P i )] 1 /( ) 1 ' ( [     . For punishment to be profitable for the enforcer, the utility gain 
from punishing must outweigh the disutility with respect to the non-enforcers, i.e., 
c n n n c n P P P i P i )] 1 /( ) 1 ' ( [ ) 1 )]( 1 /( [         . This condition is equivalent to what 
Corollary 1 proposes:  c n n P P / 1 ) ' (   . 
Corollary 1 implies for  3 / 1  c  that in an equilibrium of the class above the P-community can 
“afford” at most two payoff-maximizers independent of the community size  P n . If there are 
no enforcers in P who threaten to punish the non-contributors, the situation is “equivalent” to 
the situation in N described above: equilibria with positive contributions only exist if all 
players are conditional cooperators with  1 /   i P n R  , independent of  P n . 